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I. INTRODUCTION
Over the next decade, Artificial Intelligence (AI) may significantly trans-
form our lives, from using virtual personal assistants to travelling in self-
driving vehicles.1 AI also has the power to overcome the physical limitations of 
capital and labour and to create new sources of value and growth.2 Moreover, 
AI has the potential to change the status quo and create new business oppor-
tunities, shift surpluses for businesses, change national comparative econom-
ics3 and to significantly transform the world economy,4 as well as the economy 
of the Central and Eastern European Countries (CEECs).5 However, scholars 
and experts stress concern about sustainable development6 due to the possibil-
ity of mass unemployment,7 the military threat of autonomous weapons,8 and 
* Previous versions of this article were presented at World Interdisciplinary Network for 
Institutional Research Conference ‘Institutions and the future of global capitalism’, 14–17 Sep- 
tember 2018, Hong-Kong and at the conference ‘Institutions in the theory and practice. Past – 
present – future’, 25–26 September 2019, Poznań.
1 European Commission (2020a). White paper on Artificial Intelligence – A European approach 
to excellence and trust. COM(2020)65 final; European Commission (2018a). Commission Staff 
Working Document, Liability for emerging digital technologies, SWD (2018) 137 final; Accompany-
ing the document Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the European 
Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, on the 
Mid-Term Review on the implementation of the Digital Single Market Strategy, A connected Digital 
Single Market for All. COM(2017)228 final; European Commission (2018b). The Age of Artificial 
Intelligence, Towards a European Strategy for Human-Centric Machines. EPSC Strategic Notes, 
Issue 29.
2  Accenture (2016).
3  McKinsey Global Institute (2013).
4  European Commission (2018a), (2018b).
5  Central and Eastern European Countries (CEECs) is an OECD term.
6  According to Borys (2011), the concept of integrated order, which is a target system for sus-
tainable development, involves achieving social, institutional, political, economic, environmental 
and spatial order.
7  Arntz et al. (2016).
8  The Economist (2018).
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problems with the redistribution of wealth.9 On the other hand, the European 
Commission (Commission) argues that AI can lead to fewer fatalities on roads, 
smarter use of resources, better environmental protection, increasing the ef-
ficiency of framing, improved healthcare and a more competitive manufactur-
ing sector.10 
The Commission pinpoints that the current and future sustainable de-
velopment of the European Union (EU) Member States such as the CEECs, 
increasingly depends on the value created by data and AI in key applica-
tions of the data economy.11 However, the use of AI on a large scale comes 
with both threats and opportunities. The Commission highlights that 
lack of trust is holding back a much broader uptake of AI than at pres-
ent.12 That is why the goal of the Commission is to develop AI grounded 
on ethical and societal values, fundamental rights and freedoms.13 In order 
to achieve this goal, in the White Paper on Artificial Intelligence – A Euro- 
pean approach to excellence and trust or in Report on the safety and liabil-
ity implications of Artificial Intelligence, the Internet of Things and robot-
ics the Commission stresses the necessity of new regulatory framework, es-
pecially for high-risk AI.14 Nevertheless, the biggest problem for the EU is 
outdated law which is not suitable for solving the contemporary problems 
and threats15 posed by AI. If the damage resulting from AI usage occurs, 
victims will seek compensation. In the EU, only strict liability of produc-
ers for defective products is harmonized at the EU level, while all other 
liability regimes are regulated by the Member States like the CEECs them-
selves.16 Furthermore, in the literature on the subject, there is a high-stakes 
debate about the legal status of AI, about who should bear the liability for 
AI damages, and which liability rules will lead to welfare optimization.17 
The aim of this paper is to undertake a meta-analysis of the EU and CEECs’ 
civil liability institutions in order to find out if they are ready for the AI race. 
Particular focus is put on ascertaining whether these liability institutions will 
protect consumers and entrepreneurs, and ensure undistorted competition. 
In line with the aforementioned, the authors investigate whether the civil li-
ability institutions such as the Product Liability Directive (EU) or civil codes 
(CEECs), are based on regulations that can be adapted to the new generation 
 9 Amiot (2016).
10 European Commission (2020a), (2018a).
11 European Commission (2020a).
12 European Commission (2020a); European Commission (2020b). Report from the Commis-
sion to the European Parliament, the Council and the European Economic and Social Committee. 
Report on the safety and liability implications of Artificial Intelligence, the Internet of Things and 
robotics. COM(2020)64 final.
13 European Commission (2020a).
14 European Commission (2020a), (2020b).
15 Schwab, Davis (2018).
16 European Commission (2019). Liability for Artificial Intelligence and other emerging dig-
ital technologies. Report from the Expert Group on Liability and New Technologies – New Tech-
nologies Formation.
17 Polinsky, Rubinfeld (1988).
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of robots which will be equipped with learning abilities and have a certain 
degree of unpredictability in their behaviour. The conclusion presented in 
the paper is drawn on the basis of a review of the current literature and 
research on national and European regulations. The primary contribution 
that this article makes is to advance the stream of the research concerning 
the concepts of AI liability for damages and personal injuries. A second con-
tribution is to show that current civil liability institutions of the EU as well 
as CEECs are not sufficiently prepared for addressing the legal issues that 
will start to arise when self-driving vehicles or autonomous drones begin 
operating in fully autonomous modes and possibly cause property damage 
or personal injuries. 
II. THE EU CIVIL LIABILITY INSTITUTIONS 
According to the Commission, AI is ‘a collection of technologies that com-
bine data, algorithms and computing power’18 and ‘refers to systems that 
display intelligent behaviour by analysing their environment and taking ac-
tions – with some degree of autonomy – to achieve specific goals.’19 AI systems 
may act in unpredictable ways, for example, via a self-learning system that 
acts autonomously and independently from the designer, programmer and 
manufacturer.20 Moreover, current American or the EU jurisdictions do not 
allow for AI entities to be sued for their acts or omissions,21 or for their crimi-
nal liability.22 However, the Commission argues that the EU has a ‘robust 
and reliable safety and product liability regulatory framework and a robust 
body of safety standards, complemented by national non-harmonized liability 
legislation’.23 Furthermore, European civil liability rules should ensure, on the 
one hand, that victims of damage caused by AI products get compensation, 
and on the other hand, should provide economic incentives, for example, to 
encourage the liable producer of AI to avoid causing such damage. 
In the opinion of the Commission, the EU safety and product liability reg-
ulatory framework has to be flexible when applied to AI products.24 It should 
also continue to respect key fundamental principles of the EU, such as the 
defence of democracy, the protection of European values and data privacy, 
sustainable development, and fostering innovation and competition in the EU 
economy. Moreover, the behaviour of AI may be difficult to predict, and this 
18 European Commission (2020a): 2.
19 European Commission (2018c). Communication from the Commission to the European 
Parliament, the European Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Com-
mittee of the Regions, Artificial intelligence for Europe. COM(2018)237 final: 2.
20 Maldonado (2018).
21 United States v. Athlone Indus., Inc.
22 Lea (2015).
23 European Commission (2020b): 1.
24 European Commission (2018b).
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may lead to situations where the damage caused by AI operating with a cer-
tain degree of autonomy cannot be linked to a defect or a human wrongdoing.25 
Furthermore, according to the Commission, the following institutions are par-
ticularly important for the sustainable development of the European economy 
based on AI solutions:26
– Council Directive 85/374/EEC of 25 July 1985 on the approximation of 
the laws, regulations and administrative provisions of the Member States 
concerning liability for defective products (Product Liability Directive), the 
purpose of which is to determine the producer’s liability for damage to the con-
sumer’s health or their property caused by a defect in the producer’s products;
– Directive 2001/95/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council 
of 3 December 2001 on general product safety (Product Safety Directive), the 
purpose of which is to ensure that products offered on the EU market are safe;
– Directive 2006/42/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
17 May 2006 on machinery, and amending Directive 95/16/EC, the purpose of 
which is to ensure the protection of the health and safety of people and pets 
due to the risks arising from the use of machinery.
The preamble of the Product Liability Directive introduced the concept of 
strict liability with regard to AI producers, ‘whereas liability without fault on 
the part of the producer is the sole means of adequately solving the problem’. 
In the case of physical or material damage caused by AI products (such as self-
driving vehicles), the injured party (for example an owner) is entitled to com-
pensation only if he or she proves that the damage is due to a defect in the AI 
product (that for example self-driving vehicles did not provide the safety that 
the public, such as the owner, is entitled to expect), and that there is a causal 
link between the defective AI products (such as self-driving vehicles) and the 
damage.27 According to the Commission, product safety and liability legisla-
tion is necessary to enable European societies, in particular businesses and 
consumers, to benefit from AI, and to help protect consumers, entrepreneurs 
and undistorted competition.28 
However, are the civil liability institutions of the EU ready for the AI race, 
for example in the form of self-driving cars or drones, which may lead to conflict 
between AI manufacturers, designers, programmers, owners, users, operators 
and third parties? An autonomous drone (unmanned aircraft)29 may cause seri-
ous property damage or personal injuries by falling to the ground or colliding in-
air with another flying vessel. The Commission argues that autonomous drones 
are ‘unmanned aircrafts’ and thus may be covered by the national legislation 
of Member States and international conventions pertaining aircraft.30 In such 
25 European Commission (2018a).
26 European Commission (2018c).
27 European Commission (2020b).
28 European Commission (2018d).
29 According to Article 3 para. 30 of the Regulation (EU) 2018/1139 ‘unmanned aircraft’ 
means any aircraft operating or designed to operate autonomously or to be piloted remotely with-
out a pilot on board.
30 European Commission (2018a).
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situations, autonomous drones will be subject to a strict liability regime and 
their operator will be liable for damage. Moreover, Regulation (EU) 2018/113931 
applies to unmanned aircraft. According to Annex IX point 1.1 of this regula-
tion, the operator of an unmanned aircraft has to be aware of national regula-
tions relating to safety, privacy, data protection, liability, insurance, security, 
and environmental protection. Furthermore, ‘an unmanned aircraft must be 
designed and constructed so that it is fit for its intended function, and can be 
operated, adjusted and maintained without putting persons at risk.’ It is impor-
tant to highlight that in the EU, in line with safety regulations,32 the produc-
ers33 of autonomous drones may also be liable for damage caused by a defect in 
these unmanned aircraft. If an autonomous drone is found to be defective and 
causes death, personal injury, material damage or destruction above EUR500 
to an item of property for private use or consumption, the producers of the said 
drone will be liable, regardless of their fault. AI products34 such as unmanned 
aircraft or self-driving vehicles may be considered to be defective, according to 
Article 6 of the Product Liability Directive, when these items do not provide the 
expected safety. The Commission stresses that the strict liability of producers, 
for example, for damage caused by autonomous drones or self-driving vehicles, 
represents a powerful tool for the protection of injured persons (consumers or 
entrepreneurs).35 However, the allocation of liability for damage caused by AI 
products may be unfair or inefficient on the basis of ‘old’ European civil liability 
institutions, such as the Product Liability Directive.36 
Self-driving vehicles37 (autonomous cars), like autonomous drones, may 
cause serious damage when operating in auto-pilot mode, which that may result 
in property damage or personal injury. The Commission argues that the key 
components of the civil liability regime for self-driving vehicles are the national, 
non-harmonized liability legislation of Member States, which are applicable to 
31 Regulation (EU) 2018/1139 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 July 2018 
on common rules in the field of civil aviation and the establishing of a European Union Aviation 
Safety Agency, and in amending Regulations (EC) No 2111/2005, (EC) No 1008/2008, (EU) No 
996/2010, (EU) No 376/2014 and Directives 2014/30/EU and 2014/53/EU of the European Parlia-
ment and of the Council, and repealing Regulations (EC) No 552/2004 and (EC) No 216/2008 of 
the European Parliament and of the Council and Council Regulation (EEC) No 3922/91.
32 Directive 2001/95/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 3 December 2001 
on general product safety.
33 According to Article 3 of the Defective Product Directive: ‘“Producer” means the manufac-
turer of a finished product, the producer of any raw material or the manufacturer of a component 
part and any person who, by putting his name, trade mark or other distinguishing feature on the 
product presents himself as its producers.’
34 According to Article 2 of the Defective Product Directive: ‘“product” means all movables, 
with the exception of primary agricultural products and game, even though incorporated into 
another movable or into an immovable. “Products” includes electricity.’
35 European Commission (2018d). Evaluating of Council Directive 85/374/EEC on the ap-
proximation of laws, regulations and administrative provisions of the Member States concerning 
liability for defective products.
36 European Commission (2019).
37 According to the European Commission (2018a), self-driving vehicles are ‘motor vehicles 
equipped with systems that allow operating the vehicle without human intervention either par-
tially, or completely.’
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motor vehicles.38 Furthermore, under the preamble of the Directive 2009/103/
EC39 (Motor Vehicle Directive), all Member States must ensure that civil li-
ability for the use of vehicles will be covered by insurance. The victims of such 
accidents will thus have a direct claim for compensation for the insurer covering 
the person responsible for civil liability. However, the Motor Vehicle Directive 
does not cover accidents caused by self-driving vehicles. The Commission high-
lights that in the case of an accident caused by a self-driving vehicle, liability for 
damage may be allocated to the driver/ holder of the vehicle or to the producers 
under national liability legislation.40 However, Article 7 of the Product Liability 
Directive allows the producers of AI, such as self-driving vehicles or autono-
mous drones, to escape liability for defective AI products if they prove: i) that 
it is probable that the defect did not exist when the product was put into circu-
lation; ii) that the product was not manufactured for sale or for any economic 
purpose; iii) that the defect is due to compliance with mandatory regulations; or 
iv) that the state of scientific and technical knowledge at the time of putting the 
product on the market did not enable the defect to be to discovered. 
The Commission argues that a technology-neutral safety legal framework 
will prevent accidents with AI products. However, if such accidents happen, 
the liability framework in the EU as well as in the CEECs should ensure 
compensation for injured persons.41 Moreover, Vladeck argues that the EU 
civil liability institutions are not sufficiently equipped to address the legal is-
sues that will arise when self-driving vehicles or autonomous drones start to 
operate in fully autonomous mode, without a human in the control loop.42 It is 
very important to highlight the need for implementing the common European 
framework for civil liability of AI, and for creating a catalogue of possible AI 
concepts in accordance with the national civil liability institutions. 
The European Parliament emphasizes that the current EU civil liability 
institutions lack sufficient regulations to cover the damage caused by a new 
generation of robots which will be equipped with learning abilities and which 
will have a certain degree of unpredictability in their behaviour43. Indeed, we 
already have AI search engines as Google Search and Apple applications like 
Siri. However, the EU legal framework ‘provides a layer of protection that 
national fault-based liability alone does not provide’,44 and is extremely im-
portant for the protection of consumers, and entrepreneurs, and for ensur-
ing undistorted competition. Moreover, a common European approach to AI 
38 European Commission (2018a).
39 Directive 2009/103/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 September 
2009 relating to insurance against civil liability in respect of the use of motor vehicles, and the 
enforcement of the obligation to insure against such liability.
40 European Commission (2018a).
41 European Commission (2018d).
42 Vladeck (2014).
43 European Parliament (2017). Report with recommendations to the Commission on Civil 
Law Rules on Robotics (2015/2103(INL); European Parliament (2016). Draft Report with recom-
mendations to the Commission on Civil Law Rules on Robotics (2015/2103(INL).
44 European Commission (2020b): 12.
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is needed in order to avoid the fragmentation of the single market.45 On the 
other hand, European civil liability institutions such as the Product Liability 
Directive are based on regulations that cannot be fully adapted to the new 
generation of robots that will be equipped with learning abilities and have 
a certain degree of unpredictability in their behaviour. That is why, according 
to the Commission experts, ‘certain adjustments need to be made to EU and 
national liability regimes’.46 For example, the Commission experts indicate 
that ‘AI-driven robots in public spaces, should be subject to strict liability for 
damage resulting from its operation’,47 and ‘A person using a technology which 
has a certain degree of autonomy should not be less accountable for ensuing 
harm than if said harm had been caused by a human auxiliary.’48
III. THE CIVIL LIABILITY INSTITUTIONS OF THE CEECs
Under the Treaty of Accession, the CEECs are obliged (from the date of 
accession) to apply EU law. The principle of the primacy of EU over the CEECs’ 
law does not appear expressis verbis in the treaties, but results from the rulings 
of the Court of Justice of the EU.49 However, the law of tort of EU Member 
States, such as the CEECs, is non-harmonized (with some exceptions like the 
Product Liability Directive) and according to the Commission does not contain 
the necessary liability rules which could be applicable to damage resulting from 
AI usage.50 Meanwhile, for sustainable development of the CEECs, civil liability 
rules for artificial intelligence products have key significance.
It is important to stress that the more autonomous robots are, the less 
sufficient are the ordinary rules of liability. Under the current CEECs’ civil 
liability institutions, AI products such as AI robots or self-driving vehicles 
cannot be held liable per se for acts or omissions that cause damage to third 
parties. Moreover, the CEECs do not have civil liability institutions such as 
the French Decree no 2018-211 of 28 March 2018 on experimentation with au-
tomated vehicles on public roads, the UK Automated and Electric Vehicles Act 
2018 (c 18), Section 2 or the Italian Decree of 28 February 2018 on the testing 
of connected and automated vehicles on public roads, all of which allow for 
experimental or regular use of self-driving vehicles, with any damage caused 
by AI covered by reference to the general rules or insurance.51
In addition, in the literature in the subject there is no common agreement 
on the concept of AI civil liability. Scholars argue that AI should have the same 
45 European Commission (2020a).
46 European Commission (2019): 3.
47 European Commission (2019): 3.
48 European Commission (2019): 3.
49 See Costa v. ENEL (1964) Case 6-64; Internationale Handelsgesellschaft mbH v Einfuhr- 
und Vorratsstelle für Getreide und Futtermittel (1970) Case 11-70 or Amministrazione delle Fi-
nanze dello Stato v Simmenthal SpA (1977), Case 106-77.
50 European Commission (2019).
51 European Commission (2019).
Małgorzata Godlewska, Sylwia Morawska, Przemysław Banasik 186
liability as: i) tools;52 ii) wild animals;53 iii) legal entities;54 iv) electronic per-
sons;55 v) agents56, and vi) companies57. The chosen concept of AI civil liability 
in the CEECs will determine who will be liable for damages and personal in-
juries caused by AI to third parties (tort liability), and to owners or users of AI 
(tort and contract liability). According to the CEECs’ civil liability institutions, 
such as civil codes, the following may be liable (see Scheme 1): i) designers, for 
example for design defects; ii) programmers, for example for software defects; 
iii) manufacturers, for example for products defects, failure to warn or breach of 
warranty; iv) operators, for example based on their fault if they operate a drone 
under dangerous weather conditions or when the required maintenance was 
not performed; v) owners, for example fault-based for lack of the proper mainte-
nance of AI, or risk-based for the circulation of AI like a self-driving vehicle on 
public streets; vi) users, for example risk-based, or vii) AI itself based on fault 
(negligence) or a risk liability regime. Moreover, the liability for the damage and 
personal injury caused by AI will depend on the status of the AI ownership. AI 
may be purchased or owned. The legal owner or legal administrator of AI may 
be responsible for damage to third parties caused by AI. 
Scheme 1
Civil liability of Artificial Intelligence – possible concepts based on CEECs’ civil liability
Source: the authors’ own work based on meta-analysis of CEECs’ civil liability institutions.
52 Čerka, Grigienė, Sirbikytė (2015).
53 Lichtenstein (2017).
54 Vladeck (2014); Lea (2015); Pagallo (2018).
55 European Parliament (2016), (2017).
56 Duggal (2017). 
57 Duggal (2017). 
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Moreover, according to the meta-analysis of current civil liability institu-
tions of CEECs, AI damage may be fault-based or risk-based (see Table 1): 
i) if we treat AI as ‘vi car ious  agents’, then the driver/ holder of self-driving 
vehicle will not be liable if they exercise reasonable care when selecting the 
self-driving vehicle (for example, Article 429 of the Polish Civil Code); ii) if we 
treat AI as ‘a person  who  requires  superv is ion’, then the driver/ holder 
of self-driving vehicle will not be liable if they fulfil the requirements of their 
duty to supervise the self-driving vehicle, or if the damage would have been 
similarly caused in the case of proper conduct of supervision (for example, 
Article 427 of the Polish Civil Code); iii) if we will treat AI as an ‘animal’, 
then the driver/ holder of self-driving vehicle will not be liable if their super-
vising the self-driving vehicle exercised reasonable care or the damage would 
have occurred even if this care had been exercised (for example, Section 6:562 
of the Hungarian Civil Code); iv) if we treat AI as a ‘company or  p lant’, 
then the driver/ holder of self-driving vehicle will not be liable if the damages 
occurred as a result of force majeure, or solely by fault of the victim, or by 
fault of third party for which they are not responsible (for example, Article 
2925 of the Czech Civil Code), v) if we treat AI as a ‘means  o f  t ransport’, 
the driver/ holder of the self-driving vehicle may be released from the obliga-
tion to compensate for the damage if they prove that they could not have pre-
vented the damage despite having exerted all the efforts which may have been 
required (for example, Article 2927 of the Czech Civil Code); vi) if we treat 
AI as a ‘de fect ive  product’, then a manufacturer (importer, distributor or 
retailer) who has placed the self-driving vehicle on the market will be liable 
for damage caused by defectiveness of that product, regardless of fault (for ex-
ample, Article 1073 of the Croatia Civil Obligation Act or Article 6.292 of the 
Lithuanian Civil Code) or finally vii) if we treat AI as a ‘dangerous  th ing’, 
then the owner of the self-driving vehicle will be liable for damage resulting 
from it unless the self-driving vehicle is repossessed by the other person (for 
example, Article 1064 of the Croatia Civil Obligation Act). 
In CEECs, the strict liability regime which may be called liability for dan-
gerousness58 is dominant, but the fault-based liability regime is also impor-
tant. In the case of AI strict liability, attention is paid to the harmful effect 
caused by the manifestation of a higher risk connected with AI products. In 
such cases, the driver/ holder of AI, such as a self-driving vehicle, is liable 
for the damage caused, regardless of whether they violated the civil liability 
institutions of CEECs, or whether the driver/holder of self-driving vehicle was 
at fault. Moreover, in cases of AI strict liability for self-driving vehicles, prov-
ing causation may be easier for the victim, like in Article 1063 of the Croatian 
Civil Obligations Act: ‘Damage caused in relation to a dangerous thing or dan-
gerous activity shall be considered to result from that thing or activity, unless 
it has been proved that it did not cause the damage.’59 However, some liability
58 Koziol (2012).
59 European Commission (2019): 21.
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institutions, such as Article 436 § 2 of the Polish Civil Code, exclude passen-
gers from protection under strict liability if they are transported without any 
remuneration or other benefit.
Meanwhile, in the case of AI fault-based liability, attention is paid to 
the fault of the defendant, for example the driver/ holder of a self-driving 
vehicle for damage suffered by the victim. It is important to identify the 
duties of care the perpetrator (for example the driver/ holder of self-driving 
vehicle) should have discharged, for example upgrading the GPS system of 
a self-driving vehicle, and to prove that they did not discharge those duties. 
However, according to the Commission experts, AI products make it ‘difficult 
to apply fault-based liability rules, due to the lack of well established models 
of proper functioning of these technologies and the possibility of their devel-
oping as a result of learning without direct human control.’60 On the other 
hand, a violation of regulatory AI products requirements may lead to shift-
ing the burden of proving fault, as in Article 2911 of the Czech Civil Code,61 
Article 6:519 of the Hungarian Civil Code,62 Article 1050(1) of the Estonian 
Law of Obligations Act,63 or Article 45 of the Bulgarian Law on Obligations 
and Contracts.64
The most important civil liability institutions of the CEECs regulating the 
AI liability for damage and personal injury are national civil codes. However, 
the civil liability institutions of the CEECs are based on regulations that can-
not be fully adapted to the new generation of robots that will be equipped with 
learning abilities and have a certain degree of unpredictability in their behav-
iours. At present, the responsibility for AI damage may be bore by CEECs’ 
manufacturers, importers, distributors, retailers, operators, designers, own-
ers, users or third parties, but defences are available in each of the CEECs. 
Moreover, in practice, in the majority of the CEECs the possible concepts of AI 
liability will be as a defective product, a dangerous thing or a mean of trans-
port. According to the national civil liability institutions of the CEECs, the 
biggest variety in different concepts of AI liability are found in countries such 
as the Czech Republic, Estonia, Poland and Slovenia. 
It is important to stress the need for implementing, at the EU level, 
a common standard of care and safety for AI products that will support the 
EU competitive advantage, the sustainable development of the UE Member 
States, limit the number of litigations, protect consumers and entrepreneurs, 
and ensure undistorted competition. 
60 European Commission (2019): 23.
61 ‘If a wrongdoer causes damage to the injured party by breaching a legal obligation, he shall 
be deemed to have caused the damage through negligence.’
62 ‘Any person who causes damage to another person wrongfully shall be liable for such 
damage. The tortfeasor shall be relieved of liability if able to prove that his conduct was not 
actionable.’
63 ‘Unless otherwise provided by law, a tortfeasor is not liable for the causing of damage if the 
tortfeasor proves that the tortfeasor is not culpable of causing the damage.’
64 ‘Every person is obligated to redress the damage he has faultily caused to another person. 
In all cases of tort fault is presumed until otherwise proved.’
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IV. CONCLUSIONS
Artificial Intelligence may significantly transform our lives over the next 
decade. This study examined the possible concepts of AI liability, such as 
product, thing, wild animal, means of transport, company, agent or legal en-
tity. The outcome of our study outcome suggests that the strict liability regime 
is dominant in the CEECs, but a fault-based liability regime is also impor-
tant. However, we were not able to prove that the risk-based liability regime 
for damage and personal injury caused by AI will provide better protection of 
consumer and entrepreneurs, and ensure undistorted competition, than the 
fault-based regime. 
Moreover, a meta-analysis of civil liability institutions, such as the Prod-
uct Liability Directive (EU) and civil codes (CEECs), shows that the current 
European legal framework is not sufficiently prepared to address the legal 
issues that will arise when self-driving vehicles or autonomous drones start 
to operate in fully autonomous mode – without a human in the control loop, 
and when operating, cause property damage or personal injury. That is why 
we recommend introducing common regulations of civil liability for damages 
and personal injuries caused by AI products at the EU level, in order to avoid 
the distortion of the free movement of AI products between the EU Member 
States. A common standard of care and safety for AI products may support the 
EU competitive advantage and sustainable development, and may limit the 
number of litigations.
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CIVIL LIABILITY FOR ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE PRODUCTS VERSUS  
THE SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT OF CEECs: WHICH INSTITUTIONS MATTER?
S u m m a r y
The aim of this paper is to conduct a meta-analysis of the EU and CEECs civil liability institu-
tions in order to find out if they are ready for the Artificial Intelligence (AI) race. Particular focus 
is placed on ascertaining whether civil liability institutions such as the Product Liability Direc-
tive (EU) or civil codes (CEECs) will protect consumers and entrepreneurs, as well as ensure 
undistorted competition. In line with the aforementioned, the authors investigate whether the 
civil liability institutions of the EU and CEECs are based on regulations that can be adapted 
to the new generation of robots that will be equipped with learning abilities and have a certain 
degree of unpredictability in their behaviour. The conclusion presented in the paper was drawn 
on the basis of a review of the current literature and research on national and European regula-
tions. The primary contribution that this article makes is to advance the current of the research 
concerning the concepts of AI liability for damage and personal injury. A second contribution is 
to show that the current civil liability institutions of the EU as well as the CEECs are not suf-
ficiently prepared to address the legal issues that will start to arise when self-driving vehicles 
or autonomous drones begin operating in fully autonomous modes and possibly cause property 
damage or personal injury. 
Keywords: institutions; civil liability; liability regimes; artificial intelligence; AI liability; CEECs; 
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